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Bhartṛhari and verbal testimony: 
a ‘hyper-antireductionist’ approach? 
Marco Ferrante 
 
 
The grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari (5th. c. CE) developed a philosophy 
that is essentially characterized by the prominent role language has in 
structuring humans’ efforts to cope with reality. Within this broader picture, he 
adopted an epistemological standpoint that was somehow at odds with the 
standard view of other South Asian thinkers, usually founded on a careful and 
systematic distinction of the means able to lead to a reliable cognitive event 
(technically called pramāṇas). Bhartṛhari claimed that such an interpretation is 
rather artificial, and that a cognition is actually a multifaceted process, whose 
single components are almost always hard to pinpoint. His main theoretical 
contribution consists of affirming that such a multifaceted cognitive act is 
informed and shaped by language.  
The article deals with Bhartṛhari’s epistemology by discussing the author’s 
opinion on the nature of testimony. Furthermore, it addresses the question 
whether pure inference should always be regarded as an accurate way of 
acquiring knowledge. 
 
 
In a comprehensive evaluation of Indian philosophy, the role played by the grammarian Bharṭrhari 
(5th c. CE)1 is hard to understate. Although he formally took no part in the trends which mostly 
contributed to the classical phase of Indian thought – namely that process of mutual interaction 
between Brahmanical schools, mainly Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and their principal opponents, in 
particular the so called logical-epistemological school of Buddhism – his influence was widespread 
and his views carefully assessed by both supporters and opponents. Scholars have revealed the 
presence of his ideas in many facets of Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical traditions (Bronkhorst 
1992, 1993, 1999, 2012; Dwivedi 1991; Lindtner 1993; Torella 2008; Timalsina 2009). Yet, Bhartṛhari’s 
masterpiece, the Vākyapadīya (henceforth VP) can hardly be regarded as a conventional philosophical 
text (Aklujkar 2002: 209). It is indeed an extensive treatise meant to analyze all aspects of language by 
combining perspectives which can be categorized, depending on the circumstances, as typical of the 
indigenous grammatical tradition (vyākaraṇa), as proximate to general linguistics, or as close to the 
                                                             
 
1 On Bhartṛhari’s date see Frauwallner 1961. But if one were to accept an earlier date for the Buddhist Pramāṇavādins, as 
proposed by Krasser, Bhartṛhari’s date should be pushed back to the 4th c. CE (Krasser 2012). 
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philosophy of language. A sign of the peculiarity of the VP as a philosophical text is the absence of a 
detailed analysis of the means (pramāṇas) leading to correct knowledge (pramiti), a topic which 
usually received much attention in the works of classical philosophers (Iyer 1969: 83). This was 
probably due both to the status of the VP and to the purposes of the author: although Bhartṛhari was 
probably aware that his work would lead grammar well beyond the limits set by his predecessors, he 
nonetheless chose not to adopt the conventions of the philosophical genre,2 thus giving to the work 
that hybrid flavor that is probably one of its most distinctive features.  
All this does not imply that the VP is silent on epistemology. The philosophical views expounded 
in the text are so pervasive that no area of philosophy remains unaffected, and knowledge is no 
exception. The scholarly discussion on Bhartṛhari’s epistemology is not abundant. Its general 
features have been investigated by Subramania Iyer and Ashok Aklujkar (Iyer 1969: 83–97; Aklujkar 
1970, 1989a, 1989b and 2002) and valuable studies are available on more specific questions 
(Dragonetti–Tola 1990, Akamatsu 1993 and 1999, Vergiani 2012, Todeschini 2010, Torella 2013). In the 
following I will offer an interpretation of Bhartṛhari’s epistemological standpoint by highlighting its 
internal consistency as well as its being in harmony with other aspects of his thought. Furthermore, 
in section 3, I will try to glean Bhartṛhari’s ideas on ‘verbal testimony’ and to conjecture which 
position he would have assumed if he had known the Western contemporary debate on the issue. 
 
1. Bhartṛhari’s epistemological stance 
Bhartṛhari’s main theoretical stance is characterized by a strong, recurrent idea, namely that the 
whole prevails over the parts so that the very idea of parts is eventually unreal. The fact is stated very 
clearly from an ontological standpoint, but it is also true as far as epistemology and analysis of 
meaning are concerned. These three aspects are bound together and molded by the same theoretical 
pattern operating on different levels of analysis. The most crucial affirmation the VP makes on 
epistemology is a clear example of this attitude: Bhartṛhari explicitly holds that any cognition is 
language-based and that conceiving knowledge without the medium of language is untenable.3 The 
                                                             
 
2 Or, simply, the conventions of the philosophical genre were not fully established yet. It seems that within the Brahmanical 
milieu — without considering mentions of and quotations from lost works — a commentarial tradition did not arise before 
the 5th c. CE (the earliest extant commentaries being possibly Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya and Śabara’s Bhāṣya on the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtra, the dates of which are also uncertain). 
3 VP 1.131: na so ’sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte / 
 anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdeṇa bhāsate // 
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statement is subtle and has an impact on ontology: Bhartṛhari is defending the idea that in order to 
have cognitions, a cognized object, in technical terms a prameya, must necessarily have something in 
common with the knower (pramātṛ).4 Both in fact share the same basic feature, that is, the capability 
of being expressed through language. The affirmation implies that it is  too simple to limit language 
to its phenomenal and audible state. Language is more than that: it is the principle which permeates 
all knowable entities, including inert ones. This strong position is by itself an explicit critique of 
alternative theories of cognition (in which language is instead seen as an epistemological 
impediment),5 and constitutes the framework within which the entire epistemological standpoint of 
the VP must be assessed. 
First, although there is scholarly consensus on the fact that Bhartṛhari generally deals with 
three means of knowledge  – perception, inference and verbal testimony – (Aklujkar 1989a; 
Todeschini 2010) it is clear that for him the common systematization of the process of knowledge in 
terms of pramāṇas is merely conventional (Aklujkar 1989a: 151–152). If knowledge is always imbued 
with language, splitting it into perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (śabda), 
and so on, may be practically convenient but it is ultimately misleading.6 Furthermore, he seems 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
“In the world there is no cognition without the implication of language.  
All knowledge is manifested as if permeated by language”. 
4 The linguistic nature of the prameya is evincible from the very first stanza of the VP in which śabdabrahman is said to 
manifest itself as artha, that is, as object/meaning. As for the pramātṛ, we are dealing with a context in which the 
differentiation between subject (pramātṛ) and object (prameya), although apparently manifested, is held to be unreal. The 
Vṛtti on VP 1.54 is a typical example in which the capacity of a word (that is to say of a cognition, every act of knowledge 
being dependent on words) to illuminate and that of being illuminated are clearly equated: te cāsya 
pratipādyapratipādakaśaktī nityām ātmabhūte pṛthaktveneva pratyavabhāsete. Moreover, other passages in the Vṛtti (for example 
the one on VP 1.1: tasyaikam api caitanyaṃ bahudhā pravibhajyate) clearly identify Brahman, hence language, with the 
individual consciousness.  
5 I am referring to the position of the Buddhist Pramāṇavādins. According to the founder of the school, Dignāga, possibly a 
younger contemporary of Bhartṛhari, the only real entities are the instantaneous and non-extended particulars (called 
svalakṣaṇas), which are linguistically inexpressible. Pramāṇavādins’ position is in a sense opposed to Bhartṛhari’s: for them, 
language is crucial in providing the illusory awareness of entities extended in time and space, thus giving shape to a 
conceptualized kind of knowledge which is ultimately false. In this regard, Dharmakīrti’s statement that “conceptual 
elaboration is nescience” (vikalpa eva hy avidyā) is quite indicative. See Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti on Pramāṇavārttika 1.98-1.99 
ab. 
6 In this regard, it is interesting to note that Abhinavagupta (11th c. CE), the well-known Kashmiri polymath, whose 
philosophy was deeply indebted to Bhartṛhari, assumed a similar stance: 
prakāśo nāma yaś cāyaṃ sarvatraiva prakāśate/  
anapahnavaniyāt kiṃ tasmin mānakalpanaiḥ// Tantrāloka 1.54 
apahnutau sādhane vā vastūnām ādyam īdṛśam/ 
yat tatra ke pramāṇānām upapattyupayogite// Tantrāloka 1.57 
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ambiguous on the role human reason plays in the epistemological process. Such ambiguity is 
particularly displayed in a specific section of the VP (1.30 to 1.43) in which language is mostly 
identified with the notion of ‘tradition’ (āgama, see below for further details). This section contains a 
critique of the reliability of reason, alongside an explicit affirmation of the supremacy of traditional 
teaching over other means to gaining knowledge. The syllogism apparently followed in that section 
runs somewhat as follows: if language is identical to traditional teaching and is the common trait of 
any valid cognition, any valid cognition will be necessarily bound to tradition and, therefore, 
reasoning will play a minor role in human knowledge. Scholars have tried to temper Bhartṛhari’s 
critique by pointing out that this section explicitly deals with matters concerning dharma.7 According 
to this interpretation the author would maintain the supremacy of traditional knowledge only 
regarding actions having ‘non-visible purposes’,8 whereas in all other cases the use of reason is not 
only admitted but also helpful. Although there is little doubt that in parts of this context Bhartṛhari is 
explicitly speaking of dharmic matters, I believe that limiting the import of the criticism of reasoning 
only to actions having supra-sensorial purposes would imply a misunderstanding of his epistemology. 
I will try to show below how Bhartṛhari’s approach can be better understood by expanding the 
import of the concept of ‘traditional knowledge’ without downplaying the role of reason in human 
cognitions. 
The stanzas I mentioned above (VP 1.30 to 1.43) give a fair account of the way the author 
understands the cognitive process. The section starts with a clear acknowledgment of the role 
traditional knowledge (āgama) plays in establishing the results of actions with non-visible effects. In 
determining such results the Vṛtti affirms that “in establishing the results of actions which have non 
visible purposes the knowledge of the proper nature of things is strictly bound to traditional 
knowledge”.9 The text then goes on asking bluntly: “For, how can one trust human reasoning, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
“This light in question shines everywhere, 
and being impossible to deny it, what is the use of the means of knowledge? 
Both in negating and establishing things, since there is always that original [reality], what are the reason and the use of the 
means of knowledge?” 
7 A. Aklujkar maintains that: “B(hartṛhari) nowhere declares pratyakṣa and anumāna to be unacceptable or always unreliable’ 
(Aklujkar 1989a: 153).  Todeschini too seems to endorse the position (Todeschini 2010: 107). 
8 Generally speaking, actions which have implications within the sphere of dharma and whose effects are not perceived 
because they ripe in the future. The Vṛtti on VP 1.7 offers a short list of these actions: adṛṣṭaprayojanā 
bhakṣyābhakṣyagamyāgamyavācyāvācyaviṣayāḥ. “actions which have an invisible purpose are the ones regarding what can be 
eaten and what cannot, with whom one can have an intercourse and with whom not, what can be said and what not”. 
9 Vṛtti on VP 1.30: adṛṣtānāṃ ca karmāṇāṃ phalaniyame svabhāvasaṃvid āgamapratibaddhā. 
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never reaches any conclusion and whose [judgments of] identity and difference are not 
established?”10 Soon after, as in a musical crescendo, the criticism is directed at logical reasoning par 
excellence, inference (anumāna): “Due to the difference of condition, space and time in the various 
powers, the attainment of things on the basis of inference is extremely difficult”.11 The gist of the 
argument is given in the Vṛtti: establishing an inference is hard because a proper invariable 
concomitance (vyāpti) between probans (vyāpya) and probandum (vyāpaka) is observed very rarely. In 
fact, ordinary things are liable to modify their properties according to space (“The contact with 
mountain water is extremely cold, whereas the contact with the same water in a pot or in a 
thundercloud is extremely hot”),12 time (“Contact and so on with water in a well and so forth is 
perceived very differently in summer, winter etc.,”),13 condition (“a deviant behavior of potentialities 
is observed even for external [things] such as seeds and plants etc., because of different 
conditions”).14 The criticism proceeds considering another typical element of an inference, the cause-
effect relationship. Also in this case a proper inference can hardly be drawn because “the capacity of 
fire to produce a modification of wood and similar substances, that very capacity is stopped in case of 
substances such as a heap of clouds etc.”15 The cause-effect relationship is thus rarely permanent, for 
“the powers of substances whose efficacy is observed in a thing are difficult to ascertain in other 
things”.16 Then follows what is possibly Bhartṛhari’s most famous remark on the point; differently 
from the previous ones it does not focus on inference itself, but rather on the person who makes it: 
“One thing, even if inferred with effort by clever thinkers, is established in another way by cleverer 
ones”.17 Finally he rounds the question off by exploiting a similitude: “Similarly to a blind man 
groping his way across a rugged path, it is by no means difficult to fall if inference is the primary 
[means of knowledge]”.18 Now, if Bhartṛhari deems inference unreliable, how can one get a valid piece 
                                                             
 
10 Vṛtti on VP 1.30: ko hy anavasthitasādharmyavaidharmyeṣu nityam alabdhaniścayeṣu puruṣatarkeṣu viśvāsaḥ. 
11 VP 1.32: avasthādeśakālāṇām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu | 
 bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā || 
12 Vṛtti on VP 1.32: atiśito haimavatīnām apāṃ sparśaḥ. saḥ tu balāhakāgnikuṇḍādiṣu tadrūpāṇām evātyuṣṇa upalabhyate. 
13 Vṛtti on VP 1.32: grīṣmāhemantādiṣu kūpajalādīnām atyantabhinnāḥ sparśādayaḥ dṛśyante.  
14 Vṛtti on VP 1.32: bāhyānām api bījauṣadhiprabhṛtīnām avasthābedhād upalabhyate śaktivyabhicaraḥ. 
15 Vṛtti on VP 1.33: agnyādīnāṃ kāṣṭhādivikārotpādane dṛṣṭasāmarthyānām abhrapaṭalādiṣu dravyeṣu tathāvidhaṃ sāmarthyaṃ 
pratibadhyate. 
16 Vṛtti on VP 1.33: tatraikasmin viṣaye dṛṣṭasāmārtyhānāṃ punar viṣayāntareṣu dravyānāṃ duravasānāḥ śaktayaḥ. 
17 VP 1.34: yatnenānumito ’py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ |  
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapadyate || 
18 VP 1.42: hastasparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā |  
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of knowledge? In the end, is valid knowledge possible at all? One may try to find an answer by 
drawing on the clues scattered throughout the section considered so far.  
A first thing to point out is that Bhartṛhari accepts the existence of a special kind of knowledge 
which is typical of non-ordinary beings; these beings are characterized by having an intellect free 
from impurities and a vision similar to that of the Vedic Seers. Their cognitive capacities lie well 
beyond the domain of logical reason: their knowledge is not erroneous and has the same vividness of 
perception.19 Still, this kind of knowledge is by no means spontaneous or taken for granted: “It is 
affirmed that the visionary (ārṣam) knowledge of the Seers is manifested once their selves have been 
purified, through the merit [which derives] from traditional knowledge only”. 20  Despite the 
acknowledgment of the existence of extraordinary beings, their special powers are not regarded as 
innate, but rather seen as the results of and restrained by the authority of traditional knowledge.  
The term I render here with ‘traditional knowledge’ is āgama. A. Aklujkar (Aklujkar 1989b: 17) 
has shown that in the VP this word can assume three basic connotations. It may mean: 
• An inherited lore which is acquired by being born in a specific community.  
• A traditional mass of knowledge which is preserved in authoritative texts. 
• The Vedic revelation, embracing both the Śruti and the Smṛti. 
 
I believe that a further connotation can be added to the above scheme. In order to describe it I 
will refer to three different discussions contained in the stanzas under scrutiny. 
First, let us go back to the way Bhartṛhari conceives the cognitive process of the seers. This 
process seems to move between two extremes: on the one hand, the seers’ cognitions are 
instantaneous and immediate; on the other hand,  they are not regarded as a light in the darkness, for 
they heavily rely on a mass of traditional knowledge whereby they are underpinned, nourished and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ || 
19 VP 1.37: āvirbhūtaprakāśānām anupaplutacetasām |  
atītānāgatajñānaṃ pratyakṣān na viśiṣyate || 
“The knowledge of the past and future of those whose minds are not afflicted, and whose insights are manifested, is not 
different from perception”. 
VP 1.38: atīndriyān asaṃvedyān paśyanty ārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā | ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādhyate||  
“The word of those who, with the vision of the Seer, see what is not perceivable and is beyond the senses is not invalidated 
by inference”. 
20 Vṛtti on VP 1.30: tad arthajñānaṃ ārṣaṃ ṛṣīnām āgamikenaiva dharmeṇa saṃskṛtātmānām āvirbhavatīty ākhyāyate. In his 
commentary on the first chapter of the VP named Sphuṭākṣarā, Vṛṣabhadeva interprets the apparently redundant word 
ārṣam as indicating ‘a special kind of knowledge’: ārṣam iti jñānaviśeṣasya saṃjñā. 
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eventually made possible. I think that the same paradigm informs the cognitive process of ordinary 
people, too. In their case a cognition is an act of instantaneous awareness which is achieved through 
a body of notions the knower acquires in many ways in the course of life and even beyond. This is 
why an act of cognition cannot simply be regarded as a form of perception, inference and so on: each 
pramāṇa is always tinted by the others, and all together, simultaneously, contribute to the realization 
of a valid piece of knowledge (pramiti). Obviously, in each and every case, a single pramāṇa might be 
predominant but it never works in isolation. Bhartṛhari describes such an approach in VP 1.35 where 
the action of knowing is compared to the cognitive process of the experts of jewelry, who are capable 
of identifying the genuineness of a precious stone. This ability is not (only) a matter of inference. He 
says: “The knowledge of the experts of precious stones, coins and so forth is not inferential. It derives 
from practice (abhyāsa) and is incommunicable to others”. It is worth noting the stress on the non-
inferential nature of this pramiti, which in order to be an inference should be objective and 
communicable to others (in technical terms a parārthānumāna), and that is not the case. Furthermore, 
this knowledge has another crucial connotation: it derives from practice. And practice is somehow 
once again connected to the key concept of traditional knowledge (especially if one keeps in mind 
that the word abhyāsa expresses not only the ideas of “repetition, exercise”, but also those of “use, 
custom”). In other words, the expert of stones manages to recognize the goodness of a jewel 
instantaneously, but this pramiti is only the final result of a longer process in which many ways of 
acquiring knowledge are involved.21 All of them can be classified under the umbrella term of 
‘practice’ or ‘traditional knowledge’ (āgama). 
The second point concerns the meaning of āgama in the stanzas in question with their 
corresponding Vṛtti.22 The section employs the expression nine times. Most occurrences (7 out of 9) 
come within the first three kārikās (VP 1.30, 1.31, 1.32), the remaining ones towards the end of the 
section (VP 1.42). The first four occurrences are clearly related to the typical meaning of the term. 
Āgama means lore; it is that which has been handed down to us from immemorial time, and hence it is 
                                                             
 
21 Consider how similar to Bhartṛhari’s is Abhinavagupta’s conception: 
ratnatattvam avidvān prāṅ niścayopāyacarcanāt/  
anupāyāvikalpāptau ratnajña it bhaṇyate// Tantrāloka 1.229. 
“It is called a connoisseur of jewels somebody who, without knowing before the real essence of a stone, through a series of 
means and determinations acquires a knowledge of that [essence] which is eventually devoid of means and conceptual 
representations”. 
22 The use of the same word to indicate slightly different concepts is not limited to āgama; other crucial terms in Bhartṛhari’s 
theory have some degree of ambiguity. For instance, A. Aklujkar noticed it for pratibhā and śabdatattva (Aklujkar 1970: 11-12). 
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used here as a plain synonym of the Veda.23 The argument developed in these first stanzas is based on 
the idea that in order to understand dharma one cannot rely on logical reasoning, but has to trust the 
traditional teachings embodied in the Vedic corpus: after all, even the seers are bounded to the Śruti. 
On the contrary, the two occurrences in the Vṛtti on VP 1. 32 show a slightly different connotation. 
The context is different: the stanza is devoted to criticizing inference by showing that an invariable 
concomitance between two objects is almost always disrupted by a mutation of condition, space and 
time of the objects under discussion. Concerning this, the Vṛtti affirms that an ordinary man is unable 
to know something which is inherently difficult to perceive without the help of āgama.24 In this case 
āgama does not seem to refer to any of the senses pointed out by Aklujkar but rather to some other 
way of acquiring knowledge. 
The third and final point regards VP 1.31 which, although explicitly it treats dharmic matters, 
seems to hint at a type of knowledge that is informed by the Vedic teaching but that is not totally 
identical with it. This kind of knowledge is not defined in detail but its presence is suggested by the 
existence of ‘ways of understanding what is good for humans which are universal and well-known’.25 
To act without taking them into proper account conflicts with ordinary usage. Such ways of 
understanding are never set aside by logical reasoning.26 As remarked by the Vṛtti, these ‘ways of 
understanding’, which are evidently based on tradition, can be strong enough to cast aside some 
interpretations of the Vedic text. The point is not explicit but in the Vṛtti on VP 1.31 Bhartṛhari 
contends that wrong interpretations of the Veda are possible, and he seems to imply that only such 
‘ways of understanding’ can keep them at bay: “Some people, just by resorting at will to the teachings 
of Tradition, display a behavior which is reproachable and in opposition with the one [accepted] in 
the world”.27 The idea is that even what is stated in the Vedic text must comply with a set of values 
which is shared by the members of the Brahmanical society (“accepted in the world”) and deemed 
                                                             
 
23 Aklujkar has thoroughly discussed the meaning of Vedic revelation in Bhartṛhari’s thought in Aklujkar 2009. 
24  See Vṛtti on VP 1.32: tatra sūkṣmam avasthānaviśeṣaṃ prākṛtam aprākṛtagamyam āgamacakṣurantareṇāpratyakṣam 
anumānamātreṇāniścitaṃ kaḥ sādhayitum asaṃmudḥaḥ prayatate. 
“Which wise man would make an effort to establish that peculiarity of condition which is innate, which in such an original 
state is not knowable, which is not perceivable without the eye of tradition, and not determinable through inference 
alone?” 
Vṛṣabhadeva explains the expression aprākṛtagamyam as pratyakṣadharmabhir gamyam. That is to say that the subtle 
condition is knowable only when its properties are manifested, e.g. when it has abandoned is contracted form thanks to the 
activity of time. 
25 Vṛtti on VP 1.31: santi sādharaṇāh prasiddhāḥ puruṣahitapratipattimargāh.  
26 Vṛtti on VP 1.31: yeṣv anyathā pravṛttir lokavirasā, na ca tarkeṇa kādacid api vyudastapūrvāḥ. 
27 Vṛtti on VP 1.31: kāmam āgamoddeśaniśrayenaiva kecid vininditam api lokasamācāraviruddhācaraṇam pratipadyante. 
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fundamental to its correct functioning. Such standards of conduct are clearly drawn from the Vedic 
lore but they are eventually sanctioned by a group of individuals (śiṣṭas) whose interpretations are 
regarded as authoritative.28 The presence of these ‘ways of understanding’ seems thus to allude to a 
kind of knowledge which everybody shares, which seems to include common sense but that is not 
restricted to that. This knowledge, being eventually ‘social’, cannot be but linguistic.29  
What can we gather from these three examples? I think Bhartṛhari is using āgama to indicate a 
further way of gaining knowledge having the following characteristics: 
• it is a kind of knowledge in which abhyāsa – exercise, custom or simply experience – plays a role; 
it can be communicated to others but not in every case. 
• it is a kind of knowledge which differs from anumāna. 
• it is a kind of knowledge which not always coincides with the Vedic scripture. 
 
Āgama certainly embraces the three senses already specified by Aklujkar, being related to the 
inherited lore, to the culture acquired in the social dimension, to the teaching of a religious tradition. 
Yet, I think there is actually something more: in the end, āgama seems to indicate a kind of 
multifaceted knowledge that is not exclusively based on the perceptional and logical skills of the 
knower, but that differs also, and this is crucial, from ‘pure’ verbal testimony. Such a kind of 
knowledge is language-based and seems to be at the very core of any cognition. Are we forced on this 
basis to challenge the scholarly agreement on Bhartṛhari’s conventional acceptance of just three 
pramāṇas? I do not believe so. As far as I can see, by using āgama Bhartṛhari is not adding a further 
pramāṇa, he is rather expanding the epistemological significance of śabda by going beyond its 
connotation as ‘verbal testimony’.  
Thus, to sum up, Bhartṛhari seems to conceive the cognitive act as a multifaceted process based 
on different means of acquiring knowledge: some of those are founded on reasoning only (such as 
inference), some on traditional lore, some lie somewhere between the two. None of them is applied in 
isolation and, most importantly, all are linguistically informed.30 
 
                                                             
 
28 The role of the śiṣṭas in the VP is discussed in Deshpande 1993, Aklujkar 2004, Ferrante 2016.  
29 For a comparable, but non-Indian, perspective on the link between linguistic communication as a means of knowledge and 
society, see Lauri’s contribution to this volume. 
30 J. Bronkhorst has claimed that Bhartṛhari believed that a particular class of cognitions, namely the insights leading to the 
knowledge of the highest reality (Brahman), are not linguistically informed (Bronkhorst 1995). I have discussed this position 
in Ferrante 2014.  
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2. On the validity of inferential reasoning outside the dharmic sphere 
Let us now go back to the problem I touched upon before, and clarify why Bhartṛhari’s criticism of 
reasoning (tarka) is not to be limited to dharmic matters only. As far as the ‘non-worldly’ (alaukika) 
sphere is concerned –  a sphere that broadly speaking includes ethic and metaphysical judgments – 
there is no doubt that āgama prevails over any other pramāṇas. Yet, as we have seen in the texts 
quoted above, Bhartṛhari recommends that anumāna should be handled with care also in ordinary 
situations. Much of the problem in accepting this conclusion lies in the ambiguity of the term āgama. 
When Bhartṛhari maintains that in ordinary transactions logical reasoning is subsidiary to āgama I 
claim that he is not necessarily referring to the Veda or to some form of ‘verbal or traditional 
authority’, but he is indeed alluding to that kind of multifaceted epistemological process I tried to 
outline above.  
Let us check whether the texts support this interpretation. The idea whereby the criticism of 
reasoning is narrowed down to the alaukika sphere heavily draws on the first stanzas under analysis 
(VP 1.30 and VP 1.31, together with the corresponding Vṛtti), which explicitly mention dharma. Since 
they come first in a cluster largely devoted to epistemological questions it is tempting to conclude 
that all the ensuing considerations on the validity of tarka are limited to the alaukika sphere. But is it 
really the case? First, dharma is actually mentioned only in the first two kārikās, with no occurrence 
either in the stanzas or in the Vṛtti after VP 1.31. The absence is even more significant if one considers 
the three stanzas in which the criticism of inference is fully carried out (1.32, 1.33, 1.34). Second,  a 
careful look at these three stanzas reveals that all the examples given in the Vṛtti to illustrate why 
anumāna is unreliable discuss ordinary cases: Bhartṛhari is not at all concerned with the sphere of 
dharma (the list given in fn. 15, from VP 1.7, remains a good example), but he rather refers to ordinary 
cognitions such as the perception of cold and warm things (VP 1.32) or the capacity of fire to burn 
(VP 1.33). Third, and most importantly, there are passages in the Vṛtti which question the validity of 
anumāna also in the case of ordinary cognitions. The first relevant one belongs to the Vṛtti on VP 1.32: 
ihāvyabhicaritābhimatasāhacaryasya dṛṣṭasya saṃbandhinaḥ tatsadṛśasya vā darśanād adṛṣṭe 
saṃbandhini yaj jñānaṃ utpadyate tenāpratyakṣasyārthasya prasiddhir duravasanā. tathā hi 
avasthāntareṣu viniścitabalasattvādīnām puruṣagamyeṣu apuruṣagamyeṣu vā dṛśyante svabhāvā 
vyabhicarinaḥ. 
 
‘When the inferred object is not visible, it is really difficult to know [that] non-perceived 
object through a cognition arising from the perception of a visible one, either connected 
with or similar to the former, and whose concomitance has been conceived as non-
deviant. For example, it is observed that the proper natures of entities, the capacity of 
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which have been established [under certain circumstances], change under others, either 
accessible to human knowledge or not.’ 
 
Here Bhartṛhari is explaining that inferential knowledge is unstable because, as remarked above, 
the conditions characterizing it in a particular instance will never be exactly the same in another.  In 
this regard, the last sentence is the most relevant to us: “the proper natures of entities etc., the 
validity of which have been established under certain circumstances, change under others, either 
accessible to human knowledge or not”. The point is to understand the import of the last expression: 
“accessible to human knowledge or not” (puruṣagamyeṣu/apuruṣagamyeṣu). The translation above 
somehow follows the gloss given in Vṛṣabhadeva’s Sphuṭākṣarā where it is clearly affirmed that 
puruṣagamyeṣu/ apuruṣagamyeṣu stands for “accessible/inaccessible to perception” 
(pratyakṣeṣu/apratyakṣeṣu).31 If that is true – and there is no reason to reject Vṛṣabhadeva’s reading – 
one must conclude that anumāna is not totally reliable also when it is about things accessible to 
perception. 
Furthermore, in the Vṛtti on VP 1.42, Bhartṛhari explicitly says that inference is always rickety, 
no matter whether it concerns prameyas accessible to perception (which frequently happens with 
ordinary cognitions) or not (which always happens with cognitions concerning dharmic matters or, 
using the VP’s phrasing, “actions the purposes of which are invisible”). 
yasya hi sthālīpulākanyāyenaikadeśaṃ dṛṣṭvā śiṣṭe ‘rthe pratipattiḥ so ‘ndha iva viṣame girimarge 
cakṣuṣmantaṃ netāram antareṇa tvarayā paripatan kaṃcid eva mārgaikadeśaṃ 
hastasparśenāvagamya samatikrāntas tatpratyayād aparam api tathaiva pratipadyamano yathā 
vināśaṃ labhate, tadvad āgamacakṣuṣā vinā tārkānupatī kevelenānumānena kvacid 
āhitapratyayo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaphaleṣu karmasv āgamam utkramya pravartamano niyataṃ mahatā 
pratyavāyena saṃyujyate. 
 
‘Somebody who — on the basis of the maxim of the rice in the pot —32 having seen a part 
[pretends to] know the rest (śiste ‘rthe), is like a blind man who, without a guide endowed 
with sight, proceeds fast on a rugged mountain path. He goes on, having discerned one 
part of the track by the touch of the hand, and by knowing it (tatpratyayād), he believes 
that another part is like [the former], thus ruining himself (vināśaṃ labhate). In the same 
way, somebody who follows reason without the ‘eye’ of the tradition, whose knowledge 
of things is based on inferential thought only, who acts passing over traditional 
                                                             
 
31 See VP p. 89, l. 8-9. 
32 The maxim affirms that one should not check all the grains in a pot to determine whether the rice is cooked or not, one 
grain is enough. According to Bhartṛhari, the principle—indeed a typical case of induction—is epistemologically unreliable. 
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knowledge concerning actions having both visible and invisible purposes, that somebody 
is necessarily bound to great disaster (niyataṃ mahatā pratyavāyena saṃyujyate).’ 
 
A final, collateral point seems to corroborate this interpretation. Often the Pratyabhijñā school 
ends up being a lucid interpreter of Bhartṛhari’s thought. Concerning this point R. Torella (Torella 
2013) has convincingly shown that the Pratyabhijñā philosophers developed the idea of prasiddhi (a 
critical term in the epistemology of the school indicating a background knowledge common to every 
human being) drawing on Bhartṛhari’s tenets of pratibhā and āgama. Incidentally, this seems to 
confirm that the latter term has a significance that is not limited to the realm of dharma.33 
This interpretation of āgama as indicating a particular, multifaceted type of knowledge, instead 
of mere ‘sacred tradition’, has a clear advantage: it allows us to account for Bhartṛhari’s affirmations 
on the superiority of tradition over other pramāṇas, without regarding him as an enemy of human 
rationality. 
That said, although Bhartṛhari’s defense of āgama can be fully justified on purely epistemological 
grounds, this does not exclude that it can also be connected to his historical context and intellectual 
agenda.34 There is little doubt that one of the main goals of the VP is to revive the pāniṇian school of 
grammar, whose prestige had been progressively waning after the period of the munitraya (Pāṇini, 
Kātyāyana, Patañjali) and the very existence of which was supposedly jeopardized by a deeply 
changed socio-religious context.35 Much of the innovations of the VP, such as the stress on questions 
which are hardly discussed in the works of the previous vaiyākaraṇas, are probably rooted in the new 
historical environment, where several intellectual movements, both Brahmanical and non-
Brahmanical, were competing for their own affirmation (and probably for patronage, too). Hence, it 
does not seem out of place to suppose that Bhartṛhari followed the trend going on in his days. Indeed, 
upon a closer examination, the first part of the first chapter of the VP (from the beginning to 1.43) is 
entirely dedicated to giving a theoretical foundation to the science of grammar, a foundation that in 
                                                             
 
33 It is worth noting that in his Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī Abhinavagupta explicitly confirms the idea that for Bhartṛhari 
āgama (and obviously pratyakṣa too) is more reliable than inference: pratyakṣāgamau bādhakau anumānasya iti tatrabhavad-
bhartṛharinyāyabhāṣyakṛtprabhṛtayaḥ (‘According to the venerable Bhartṛhari, to the author of the Nyāyābhāṣya and to others, 
both āgama and direct perception invalidate inference’). See ĪPV on 2.3.1-2. Iyer-Pandey edition: 89-90. 
34 Todeschini had the merit to draw attention to the VP’s apologetic side, a topic that so far has unfortunately received very 
little attention. Yet, in this particular case, I am not convinced that Bhartṛhari’s aim ‘is [to secure] his own tradition from 
possible criticism leveled through reason’ […] ‘by securing the words and the perceptions of śiṣṭas/āptas from inference’ 
(Todeschini 2010: 103). 
35 See Bhartṛhari’s account of the history of vyākaraṇa contained in VP 2. 481-2.487. In particular, VP 2. 485 deals with the 
decay of grammar after Patañjali. 
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the ‘new world’ cannot be limited anymore to the old five ‘purposes’ put forth by Patañjali at the 
beginning of his Mahābhāṣya (rakṣa, ūha, āgama, laghu, asaṃdeha, namely protection of the Vedic text, 
adaptation of the Vedic mantras to the rituals, complying with the Vedic tradition, economy of 
expression, removal of doubt). The strategy Bhartṛhari implemented was deeply connected with the 
intellectual setting he lived in. In order to be effective, and possibly in order to appeal to a potential 
audience, any intellectual proposal should have a soteriological drive and should be able to say 
something about ‘spiritual’ questions. Bhartṛhari addressed the problem by elaborating on the causal 
link, established by his predecessors, between the grammatical science and the knowledge of the 
Veda. But he went further by adding another step: drawing on proto-Vedāntic ideas (the historical 
contours of which are obscure but which were probably lively at his time)36 he gives to the Veda–
Language–Grammar relation an ontological status, by identifying the sacred text with the 
metaphysical principle that permeates all aspects of reality, Brahman. Once the pervasiveness of 
language is accepted, it must be maintained at every level of analysis, otherwise the grounds on 
which the authority of grammar is built would crumble. Epistemology is no exception and the 
criticism of inference must be understood within the picture that has emerged so far. Having in mind 
the authoritativeness of grammar as the final goal, Bhartṛhari thus defends the idea that every 
cognition is linguistically determined and that all cognitions are conceptual representations (in 
technical jargon savikalpakajñāna). If it is relatively easy to maintain, in the given cultural context, 
that dharmic questions can be addressed only via āgama–śabda–Veda, it is certainly harder to 
establish it for ordinary cognitions, for which perception and inference seem to be reliable ways of 
gaining knowledge. A possible solution is to conjecture that Bhartṛhari developed his multifaceted 
way to conceive ordinary knowledge (which, it is useful to repeat it, is permeated by savikalpaka 
cognitions such as verbal testimony, memory, inherited lore, religious scriptures, common notions 
etc.) precisely in order to overcome this difficulty. But the inevitable consequence of this strategy is 
the demotion of inference to a pramāṇa unable to produce correct knowledge independently from 
other factors.  
 
3.  Bhartṛhari’s approach to verbal testimony 
Given these premises, one may conjecture which position Bhartṛhari would take in the 
philosophical debate on the role of verbal testimony. Following the path paved by E. Freschi in her 
                                                             
 
36 The most reliable studies on the early history of Vedānta remain those by H. Nakamura (Nakamura 1983 and Nakamura 
2004). On Bhartṛhari as a vedāntin thinker, see Nakamura (2004: 457 ff.) and Ferrante 2015. 
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introductory essay, one may wonder in which category Bhartṛhari’s ideas on testimony fall. Does he 
regard verbal testimony as an independent means of knowledge (thus being an anti-reductionist) or 
not (hence a reductionist)? If the former is the case, where would the authority of language come 
from? Would it come from language itself (as argued by Mīmāṃsakas) or from some other source 
external to language itself (simply put, the position of Naiyāyikas)? As it will be clear below the 
answer is not as straightforward as it seems. 
First, one can doubt the validity of the questions, and with reason: as remarked above, 
Bhartṛhari is explicit in denying any differentiation between pramāṇas and seems to endorse an 
integrated view of the act of knowledge. Notwithstanding this, it seems to me that such questions 
remain legitimate. After all, the core element of a verbal testimony consists of its being ‘verbal’, 
hence ‘linguistic’.37 I think that in order to better appreciate Bhartṛhari’s position one has to keep in 
mind that he seems to adopt the perspective of the two different points of view:38 the one of ordinary 
reality, which in the VP is often indicated with the term vyāvahārika, and the one of true reality, 
which we may call for the sake of convenience pāramārthika, even if the term is rarely used in the VP 
(Ferrante 2015, 78). This approach is not unusual in the scholastic phase of Indian thought, but 
actually not that common if we limit our considerations to the Brahmanical milieu up to the 5th c. CE. 
Probably the idea occurred for the first time within Buddhist Mādhyamika circles and was 
systematically adopted by Brahmanical thinkers only much later.39 By analyzing the issue of ‘verbal 
testimony’ from Bhartṛhari’s vyāvahārika standpoint one may be let down. As I noted above, 
Bhartṛhari does not indulge in analyzing epistemological questions. Moreover, there are no clues to 
understand which position he would assume in the debate on testimony, even if the discussion was 
presumably going on among his contemporaries. Such an attitude might have two reasons. On the 
one hand, Bhartṛhari acknowledges that the description of the process of knowledge elaborated by 
fellow Brahmanical thinkers (such as Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas) is totally acceptable as far as 
ordinary reality is concerned, and hence there is no need to expand it or to discuss it thoroughly. But, 
on the other hand, this lack of discussion can be read as a sign that the epistemology of pramāṇas is 
ultimately not so crucial for Bhartṛhari’s purposes. I suspect that this attitude is related to the 
                                                             
 
37 In Indian philosophical jargon the word most commonly employed to indicate verbal testimony is śabda, simply language. 
In the VP the term is evidently crucial, still it is rarely used with the epistemological connotation so frequent elsewhere.   
38 Actually, perhaps even more (Aklujkar 2002: 217-218). 
39 The oldest occurrence of the concept seems to be found in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.10, roughly 2nd c. CE. In 
Brahmanical philosophy the earliest systematic use of the two degrees of reality is that of Advaita Vedānta (approximately 
from 8th c. CE onwards). 
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acceptance of various levels of reality. By adopting this approach, the analysis of the lower level, no 
matter how conceived, is never performed to provide a picture of how things really are, since it will 
be sooner or later superseded by a higher, more refined, explanation. The analysis of the lower 
degree is thus always carried out for explicative purposes (and also because, one may fancy, if there 
were no lower reality there would not be anything to discuss at all). This sometimes causes a sense of 
bewilderment in the interpreter. When one is expecting from a text a thorough analysis of a certain 
question the actual discussion often ends up being minimal. In other cases, the opposite happens. In a 
sense there is always a rationale: the most debated aspects of lower reality are usually the ones who 
are deemed crucial for obtaining the higher one.40 Bhartṛhari might be one of these cases. Even if his 
ontology does not presuppose that ordinary phenomena are unreal, he nonetheless grants Brahman, 
the highest reality, more ontological vividness. This might imply that every question belonging to the 
lower realm can be ignored because eventually it becomes irrelevant. Still, there are problems, which 
can be easily dismissed as unimportant from the highest perspective, which are minutely discussed 
from the vyāvahārika perspective. The VP offers a gigantic example of this stance. In accordance with 
the principle that the whole is more real than the parts, Bhartṛhari maintains that the sentence and 
its meaning are indivisible units and constitute the basis of linguistic communication. On that point 
his final position is that the meaning of a sentence is not understood by simply putting together the 
meanings of the individual words. Yet, it is a matter of fact that most of the VP is dedicated to the 
analysis of units smaller than the sentence, thus devoted to something that is, from the pāramārthika 
perspective, non-existent. Why? Simply because Bhartṛhari is a grammarian and he has to adopt this 
stance for practical reasons. As nicely put by S. Iyer: “To agree that the indivisible sentence has to be 
divided for practical purposes is a kind of climb down for the grammarian but he has to do it because 
he cannot perform his task unless the sentence is analyzed”. (Iyer 1969: 220). In VP 2.233 Bhartṛhari is 
much more explicit than Iyer: “In scientific treatises, that which is described through the distinction 
of grammatical categories is nescience”.41 Evidently, questions such as the epistemological ones do 
not raise the same interest in the grammarian and thus remain in the dark, reaching their full sense 
only in the higher perspective. Within this higher perspective the role of language is amplified to the 
extent that it becomes the underlying logical structure of reality (in the VP’s jargon paśyantī vāc or 
                                                             
 
40 The argument is typically used, for instance, in the case of the philosophy of Dharmakīrti (Dunne 2004: 65). 
41 VP 2.233a: śāstreṣu prakriyābhedair avidyopavarṇyate. 
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parapaśyantī vāc). 42 If one puts oneself in this perspective, language is everything and molds 
everything. By endorsing this view, and therefore by endorsing the process of knowledge implied in 
it, a discussion on testimony becomes possible and Bhartṛhari can be considered an anti-reductionist 
thinker claiming that the authoritativeness of language lies in language itself. But, in a sense, he 
would be even more than that: if in the end all cognitive processes are to be reduced to language, and 
if language is the core trait of verbal testimony, then it would not be out of place to regard Bhartṛhari 
as a hyper-antireductionist; at least, as far as the pāramārthika dimension is concerned. 
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Appendix: The VP stanzas from 1.30 to 1.43 
VP 1.30 na cāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate/ 
ṛṣīṇāṃ api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam// 
 
VP 1.31 dharmasya cāvyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ / 
na tāṃl lokaprasiddhatvāt kaścit tarkeṇa bādhate// 
 
VP 1.32 avasthādeśakālāṇāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / 
                                                             
 
42 In VP 1.159 Bhartṛhari holds that language is manifested in three forms: the audible and articulated language (vaikhārī 
vāc), the mental, inaudible one (madhyamā vāc), the unitary and inner one in which every kind of differentiation is lost 
(paśyantī vāc). Some scholars have argued that Bhartṛhari envisioned a fourth stage, often called parā paśyantī, 
corresponding to pure consciousness (cit). Aklujkar has hinted at the possibility (Aklujkar 1970: 77-81), but nonetheless 
stressed that the parā paśyantī level should be regarded as a further articulation of paśyantī or, simplifying, a different way to 
look at paśyantī. M. Biardeau (Biardeau 1964: 6) tried to trace the presence of parā paśyantī also in VP 1.14, without, in my 
opinion, much success. 
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 bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā // 
 
VP 1.33 nirjñātaśakter dravyasya tāṃ tām arthakriyām prati / 
viśiṣṭadravyasaṃbandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate//  
 
VP 1.34 yatnenānumito ’py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / 
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate // 
 
VP 1.35 pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate / 
maṇirūpyādivijñānaṃ tadvidāṃ nānumānikam // 
 
VP 1.36 pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca vyatikramya vyavasthitāḥ / 
pitṛrakṣaḥpiśācānāṃ karmajā eva siddhayaḥ // 
 
VP 1. 37 āvirbhūtaprakāśānām anupaplutacetasām / 
atītānāgatajñānaṃ pratyakṣān na viśiṣyate // 
 
VP 1.38 atīndriyān asaṃvedyān paśyanty ārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā / 
ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādhyate //  
 
VP 1.39 yo yasya svam iva jñānaṃ darśanaṃ nātiśaṅkate / 
sthitaṃ pratyakṣapakṣe taṃ katham anyo nivartayet // 
 
VP 1.40 idaṃ puṇyam idaṃ pāpam ity etasmin padadvaye / 
ācaṇḍālamanuṣyāṇām alpaṃ śāstraprayojanam // 
 
VP 1.41 caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate / 
āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate // 
 
VP 1.42 hastasparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā / 
anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ // 
 
VP 1.43 tasmād akṛtakaṃ śāstraṃ smṛtiṃ ca sanibandhanām / 
āśrityārabhyate śiṣṭaiḥ sādhutvaviṣayā smṛtiḥ // 
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